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meetings and involving them in training and doctrine 
development, the CCOE has made a significant 
contribution to improving civil–military cooperation and 
interaction. The CCOE serves as an important entry-
point for humanitarian actors to engage in dialogue 
with the military on civil–military interaction, and can 
also explain military doctrine, procedures and attitudes 
to humanitarian counterparts. The CCOE has found that 
some of the most useful input and feedback on CIMIC 
doctrine and guidelines has come from external non-
NATO sources. 
The CCOE’s approach to engaging with civilian actors 
involved in delivering humanitarian and development 
assistance has enabled it to build trust with these 
organisations and to better understand their principles, 
objectives and culture. As a result, NATO and the 
humanitarian and development communities are more 
open to engaging constructively with each other. 
Lieutenant Colonel Heiko Herkel is Staff Officer Concepts, 
Interoperability, Capabilities, Civil–Military Co-operation 
Centre of Excellence.
Testing the cultural boundaries of the British military
Lauren Greenwood
The British military has faced a range of challenges when 
engaging with non-military actors in ‘population-centred’ 
counter-insurgency and stabilisation operations. Such 
actors include humanitarian agencies, non-government 
organisations, civilian populations and national and 
international government institutions. There has been 
considerable resistance, especially from the British 
Army, to processes that have the potential to undermine 
traditional military combat skills. Managing the interface 
with civilian organisations is the task of the tri-service 
British Military Stabilisation Support Group (MSSG), 
formerly the Joint Civil Military Cooperation Group. 
Members of the MSSG must learn and then embody a 
new set of rules and cultural codes that allows them to 
take military practices out of the strict confines of military 
hierarchies and into the comparatively undisciplined, 
messy and unpredictable civilian sphere. This includes 
developing an awareness of humanitarian principles and 
stabilisation practices, and educating the wider armed 
forces about these concepts, both during training in the 
UK and on deployment. These challenges have heightened 
the tension between tradition and change within the 
British military, and have tested identities, boundaries 
and roles in a plethora of ways. This article explores three 
problem areas: the (re)negotiation of masculinity; issues 
of ‘common sense’; and the effect of increased civilian 
interactions on military leadership styles.1 
(Re)negotiating masculinity
Gender, and the relational constructions of masculinity 
and femininity, can be conceived of as practices that 
are produced socially, where social structures shape 
the actions of individuals and vice versa.2 Masculinity is 
socially and culturally expressed, and is not confined to 
just the male body: both men and women go through a 
militarisation process in which they learn to reproduce a 
range of culturally specific military masculinities within the 
confines of their respective service. Military institutions 
exhibit certain particular characteristics, including clearly 
defined physical and social boundaries, with members 
working and living together in barracks that provide 
a place of residence for large numbers of like-minded 
individuals.3 The identities of British military recruits are 
heavily influenced by the service they join – the Royal 
Navy, the British Army or the Royal Air Force – by their 
position within the military hierarchy, and whether they 
are regular or reserve members. This complex identity 
is visually and formally illustrated by military uniforms, 
which locate individuals by service, rank and branch, 
each with its formal and informal cultural codes. Behind 
the uniform is a military institution that is culturally rich 
and diverse, and much broader than popular stereotypes, 
with a multiplicity of roles and competing and potentially 
paradoxical identities.  
For the British Army, warfighting demands that soldiers 
see themselves as warriors, with a warrior ethos. 
Counter-insurgency and stabilisation, with their focus on 
populations rather than, or at least in addition to, ‘the 
enemy’, challenges this traditional warrior ethos. Such 
operations require a different set of qualities, skills and 
practices, including ‘emotional intelligence, empathy, 
subtlety, sophistication, nuance and political adroitness’.4 
They entail restraint within the rules of engagement, 
heightened force protection and interaction with the 
media. They also involve working with a range of ‘non-
warrior’ actors, the deconstruction and problematisation 
of the objective term ‘enemy’ and a focus on long-term 
solutions.5 These two self-perceptions – of the traditional 
warrior and this new ‘population-centred’ warrior – are 
essentially mutually exclusive, and handling the tension 
between them can be extremely difficult.6 
For stabilisation operatives, managing the interface 
between the military and the civilian worlds requires a 
fundamental shift in mindset. British military stabilisation 
1 L. Greenwood, British Military Stabilisation Training and the Negotiation 
of Masculinity: ‘It’s Not Pink and Fluffy, It’s Difficult and Dangerous’, 
unpublished PhD thesis, University of Sussex, 2012. 
2 R. Connell, Gender (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002). 
3 C. Kirke, ‘Orders Is Orders … Aren’t They? Rule Bending and Rule 
Breaking in the British Army’, Ethnography, vol. 11, no. 3, 2010.
4 J. Kiszely, ‘Learning About Counter-Insurgency’, RUSI Journal, vol. 151, 
no. 6, December 2006.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
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training teaches new recruits a spectrum of ‘masculinities’, 
from the kinetically oriented combat soldier, where 
weapon-handling skills, fitness and situational awareness 
are necessary to establish trust within the team, to the 
more feminised and ambiguous masculinity of the military 
facilitator. This facilitator masculinity is constantly in 
flux, and while it draws on the dominant masculinity of 
the combat soldier and notions of emotional control as 
the first point of acceptance and credibility, especially 
in terms of situational awareness, it also expands, 
restrains and resists elements of this combat masculinity, 
through specific articulations of cultural awareness and 
empathy. In this sense, stabilisation operatives are caught 
between the demands of the ‘disciplined’ military body 
and the creative subjectivity of the military facilitator, 
where challenging traditional military perceptions is a 
fundamental aspect of the role. The skilled stabilisation 
operative develops a ‘chameleon-like’ flexibility between 
these masculinities. 
‘Common sense’?
Within the military ‘common sense’ is something that is 
formally trained and drilled, a specific way of doing things, 
of unifying behaviour and making reactions predictable 
in situations of intense pressure. A phrase I repeatedly 
heard from stabilisation operatives during my fieldwork 
was: ‘It’s just common sense, people just need to be able 
to speak to other people’. But ‘common sense’ within a 
military setting is very different to ‘common sense’ in a 
civilian or humanitarian setting. To the military, ‘common 
sense’ means referring to books, pamphlets or doctrine: it 
is, in other words, a ‘way of doing things’ that is rational, 
efficient and objective. It is also culturally dependent.
In stabilisation operations, black and white, clear-cut 
military approaches are substituted for complexity, 
ambiguity, uncertainty, a focus on restraint and an under-
standing of the importance of intangible processes, such 
as generating a sense within communities that their 
perspectives have been heard. 
However, within the wider 
military an end product is often 
seen as more important than pro- 
cess. As one informant put it: 
‘When on tour people [the 
wider military] kept saying what 
does the doctrine say? We kept 
turning around and going what 
doctrine, there is no doctrine 
for this’. When the British mili-
tary’s stabilisation doctrine (Joint 
Doctrine Publication 3-40 on 
Security and Stabilisation: The 
Military Contribution) was pro-
duced in November 2009 it was 
criticised within the military for 
not being ‘doctrine’ as commonly 
understood: it was too ‘grey’ and 
‘ambiguous’, and it failed to set 
out the ‘fundamental guiding 
principles’. An attempt to address 
this was made with the release 
in April 2010 of A Guide to Joint Doctrine Publication 3-
40 Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution, 
which is designed to be read quickly and feed the military’s 
need for clarity, certainty and speed. 
Whilst on field research I watched one stabilisation 
Commanding Officer chatting with their six-person Military 
Stabilisation Support Team during a training exercise, 
trying to explain the team’s role and asking them to 
start ‘thinking outside the box’. Many people ‘got it’ 
and, although a difficult task, took to the role relatively 
quickly. Others found the ambiguity and flexibility highly 
frustrating. A lack of flexibility and lateral thinking within 
the army has, on a number of occasions, been described to 
me using the Parachute Regiment phrase ‘bone’:
bone, completely indoctrinated, 100% Army, twenty 
years of being an Infantry man or Cavalry man. You 
explained it [civil–military coordination, stabilisation] 
to them and they get it, they understand, it’s not a 
difficult concept to understand, but there were lots 
of people who should know better in theatre who still 
don’t get it.
Once trained, it is the military Stabilisation Operatives’ 
role to help educate the wider military in these principles, 
although evidently this is taking time to feed into wider 
military culture. 
Leadership
The skilled stabilisation operative develops the leadership 
skills to help the wider military valorise interaction 
through culturally specific forms of communication and 
discussion to establish and build relationships. One way 
of achieving this is in the practical application of the term 
‘courageous restraint’, a term coined by American General 
Stanley McChrystal. The term connects courage, one of the 
valorised attributes of soldiering associated with bravery 
under fire, to a form of self-control that associates bravery 
British soldiers on patrol near Camp Bastion in Afghanistan
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with the resistance of conditioned reflexes, valorising ‘the 
use of brainpower rather than firepower’. The power vested 
in the word courage has been attached to what is viewed 
by some as a softer or more feminine form of performance. 
Paradoxically, restraint for the combat soldier is harder to 
perform. The term, although not the concept, was short-
lived, going out of fashion in 2010. It was replaced by 
the phrase ‘tactical patience’, which was deemed to be 
less confusing for soldiers and ‘more war-y’ through the 
removal of any associations with emotion, especially the 
emotions invoked by the word courage. During fieldwork 
I heard stories of how military stabilisation operatives 
had either successfully or unsuccessfully used their 
training and experience to persuade the wider military 
to use ‘courageous restraint’ or ‘tactical patience’ and 
adopt ‘population-centred’ stabilisation practices. As one 
informant told me, this was not easy: ‘generally, the ideas 
for counter-insurgency or stabilisation are not that easy to 
reconcile with red meat-eating killers. A lot of them really, 
really, want to get into fire fights’.
Good leadership, military teamwork and physical fitness 
are fundamental skills taught during military training. 
It is a powerful emotion to be part of a team that 
is working efficiently and symbiotically. Multi-actor 
stabilisation operations provide testing conditions 
for military leadership styles. Stabilisation operatives 
are required to fit into the infantry-dominated military 
chain of command, and embed with infantry patrols 
on the ground and in military headquarter formations. 
To perform their role effectively they must learn to 
switch between quite different leadership styles: a direct, 
forceful, sometimes aggressive style when dealing with 
soldiers or the military chain of command, and a quieter, 
softer but still direct style when dealing with all the other 
actors involved. Essentially, as one operative told me: 
‘It’s all personality driven; it’s about getting relationships 
going. Stabilisation Operatives need to demonstrate that 
they are a vital component both up and down the military 
chains of command’. It is evident that the masculinity 
of the combat soldier, and its forceful and direct style 
of leadership, remain dominant within the British Army. 
However, if Stabilisation Operatives are able to gain 
credibility, and therefore power and authority, they have 
the means to ‘influence, cajole and sometimes slap’ the 
fighting-oriented soldiers they work alongside towards 
adjusting to population-centred stabilisation practices.
Conclusion
Stabilisation operatives must act as ‘go-betweens’ in the 
complex area opened up between bounded, disciplined 
and hierarchical mainstream military institutions and the 
comparatively undisciplined and unpredictable ‘outside 
world’. By becoming ‘critical centres of knowledge’ and 
learning how to engage with controlled and rationalised 
forms of emotion and empathy, stabilisation operatives 
challenge the dominant masculinity of the traditional 
soldier on the ground. On the one hand, operatives must 
live up to the ideal of ‘the soldier’, the warrior; on the 
other, they are expected to engage with non-traditional 
forms of conduct and emotion that pose a threat to both 
the status and identity of ‘the soldier’. 
Military Stabilisation Operatives are now being referred 
to as ‘hybrid soldiers’. While the British military has 
been slow to adapt,7 it is this ‘hybrid soldier’ that the 
humanitarian community will increasingly be engaging 
with in stabilisation operations. This ‘hybridity’ is achieved 
through formally and informally negotiating masculine 
performance, ‘common sense’ knowledge, learning to deal 
with ambiguity and intangibility, prioritising process over 
product and developing the flexibility to switch between 
leadership styles. 
Lauren Greenwood has recently completed an Economic 
and Social Research Council (ESRC)-funded DPhil within 
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7 S. Catignani, ‘“Getting COIN” at the Tactical Level in Afghanistan: 
Reassessing Counter-Insurgency Adaptation in the British Army’, Journal 
of Strategic Studies, vol. 35, no. 4.
Building consensus within the humanitarian community: lessons 
learned from the revision process for the IASC guidelines on the use 
of military and armed escorts
Jules L. Frost
In July 2011, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) 
Working Group asked the Task Force on Humanitarian Space 
and Civil–Military Relations to review and update the IASC 
Non-binding Guidelines on the Use of Military and Armed 
Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys (2001). The primary 
concerns that led to the decision to revise the guidelines 
were the recognition of a growing reliance on armed escorts, 
the need to synchronise a more robust decision-making 
process on the use of armed escorts with the new UN 
Security Management System (SMS) and inconsistencies 
in the interpretation and application of the out-of-date 
guidelines. The revised guidelines, which are currently 
under review by the IASC Working Group and Principals, 
include a new section which encourages due consideration 
of alternatives to armed escorts. Throughout the revised 
guidelines, greater attention is drawn to the importance 
of conducting comprehensive security risk assessments 
that emphasise programme criticality as well as threat, 
